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is practiced. Despite the fact that in other fields of educational endeavor the
Equal Protection Clause seems to be satisfied by duplication of educational facili-
ties, vet as concerns legal education Vinson declares:
"The law school, the proving ground for legal learning
and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one
who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic va-
cuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of
views with which the law is concerned." [Italics our own]
This language implies that the separation of Negro law students from white
law students and from the association with the major racial group will be detn-
mental to their fullest accomplishment in their study of the law, because of the in-
trinsic and peculiar nature of the law. If the above excerpt is more than mere
dictim it may well be said that the United States Supreme Court will reverse
the North Carolina District Court's decision in the Epps case should that case
appear on appeal before the high Court. Such a reversal would be based on
something deeper than a mere consideration of the plant facilities of the two
schools, namely, that because of the very nature of the subject there can be no
real equality in the study of the law where segregation exists.
MYER S. TuLKOFF
RIGHT OF CHILD OF SLAYER TO INHERIT FROM SLAYER'S
VICTIM - BATES V WILSON
In Bates v Wilson a son killed his father and mother, the father dying first.
His property was devised to his wife. She died intestate immediately thereafter
leaving as possible heirs her murderer, the murderer s daughter, and another son.
The slaver s daughter, by her guardian, claimed the interest in her grandparent's
estate that her father would have taken had he not murdered them. Held: The
daughter is entitled to such interest since the slayer "should be considered as
though he had preceded in death the person whom he killed."'
Before discussing the problem presented, we must look to see whether the
slayer could himself take from his benefactor. At common law, a majority of
states allowed an heir who killed to take from a person who died intestate.
3 The
reason for this majority view, as stated in a Kentucky case,
' is that, since the
statutes of descent and distribution make no exception for such a situation, the
courts should not imply one. A few courts give as a basis for so holding the
constitutional and statutory provisions against forfeitures for crime.' However, a
strong minority even without a statute refused to allow a slaying heir to take
'Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888); Hagna v. Cone, 21
Ca. App. 416, 94 S.E. 602 (1917); Wall v. Pfanschimdt, 265 IlM. 180, 106 N.E.
78b (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 P. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Ever-
sole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W 487 (1916); Gillnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128
N.W. 292 (1910); Shellenberger v. Ransom 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W 935 (1894).
'313 Ky. 572, 232 S.W 2d 837 (1950).
Id. at 575, 232 S.W 2d at 838.
'Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W 487 (1916).
'See Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 586, -- 36 A. 2d 888, 890 (ch. 1944).
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
from the intestate.' This is based upon the inequity of allowing um to so re-
ceive. "No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage
of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own inquity, or to acquire
property by is own cnme."- These maxims are based upon a public policy
which seems very reasonable. Some of the jurisdictions, reaching the same result
as the minority, allow the slayer to take, but impress the property with a con-
structive trust for the heirs and next of kin of the deceased, exclusive of the
murderer.'
Where the deceased leaves a will, there are some cases at common law
denying the right of the slayer to recover.' Such a holding where a will is present
could justifiably be followed in a jurisdiction which would otherwise permit the
slayer to recover, since a court might imply a condition to the right to take under
the will. However, the cases found by the writer taking this view are from juns-
dictions which follow the minority rule as to intestacy.
Present day statutes, however, have generally changed the common law
majority rule."0 Many states, after their courts had followed the common law and
allowed recovery, forthwith passed statutes disallowing the slayer to recover."'
The Kentucky statute provides that one who takes the life of another and is con-
victed of a felony therefor forfeits all interest in the decedent's property and
" the property interest so forfeited descends to the decedent's other heirs-at-
law, unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent."' Since the passage of the
Kentucky Act in 1940 there have been very few cases decided under its pro-
visions. In the first case so decided, Pierce v. Pierce, a minor son killed his father
and thereby his grandfather inherited the realty and personalty. The grand-
father entered into a contract with the slayer s guardian for purchase by the
slayer of the property. The court strictly construed the statute and allowed the
son specific performance of the contract." The only other Kentucky case under
this statute stems from the same facts as the principal case. There, the slayer
attempted to circumvent the statutii by mortgaging the property to pay his at-
torneys fees before his conviction. The court held that the mortgage was invalid
and that the slayer forfeited the right to take immediately upon killing and that
the conviction was merely a judicial determination that he had forfeited such
right."
Applying these principles to the principal case, was the court correct in
allowing the slayers daughter to take his share? The court added to the Ken-
tucky statute, by judicial interpretation, the words of the Ohio statute" that the
a Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923);
Uarwols v. Bankers Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W 239 (1930); Perry v.
Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W 641 (1908).
'Box v. Lamer, 112 Tenn. 393, - 79 S.W 1042, 1045 (1904).
aBryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Whitney v. Lott,
134 N. J. Eq. 586, 36 A. 2d 888 (Ch. 1944); Aams, LEcTuRas ON LEGAL HISTORY
p. 310 (1913).
° Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); In re Wilkins Estate,
192 Wis. 111, 211 N.W 652 (1927).
" BordweUll, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REv. 283, 304 (1929).
' Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution, 49 HA.v. L. REv. 715, 716 (1936).
"Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 381.280 (1948).
'Pierce v. Pierce, 309 Ky. 77, 216 S.W 2d 408 (1949).
' Wilson v. Bates, 313 Ky 333, 231 S.W 2d 39 (1950).
' Omo GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 10503-17 (Page, 1938).
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slayer " shall be considered as though he had preceded in death the person
he killed." The court, it seems, took the view that the slayer was civiliter mortus
in order that the innocent child of the slayer should not suffer merely because of
his conduct. The doctrine of civiliter mortus has been criticized." The statute
should be applied strictly and there is nothing in the statute which would war-
rant the application of this doctrine. The child is allowed to take merely because
of the wrongful conduct of the father. She is the natural object of his bounty,
and therefore in cases where he is given death for his crime, the court, by allowing
the daughter to take, is in fact following the majority common law view that
would allow the slayer to take and the daughter would take from um as his heir.
Also there is a great possibility that the slayer would benefit from his act because
it is only natural that his child will use the funds to aid um.
The better view would seem to be one which disallows recovery, although
such a view is harsh in some cases, including the principal case. This would place
the greater penalty upon the slayer s act and more nearly carry out the intention
of the legislature.
GERALD ROBIN GRIFFIN
"i Note, 21 VA. L. Rsv. 232 (1934).
